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Abstract: This paper describes two modes of civic religious pluralism in Bali. The first is 
adaptive pluralism in which elements of Islam were incorporated into pre-modern 
Balinese states.  Analysis focuses on the way in which Gusti Ayu Made Rai, an 
eighteenth-century Balinese princess became Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, one Indonesia’s 
few widely recognized female Muslim saints. This leads to an alternative reading of 
Balinese religious history, countering the view that it is a static monolithically Hindu 
tradition. Rather than turning inward as the surrounding areas embraced Islam, 
Balinese kingdoms included Muslims and Islam in scared narratives and geographies.  
Today this integrative strategy functions only at the local level. Pilgrimage to her grave 
by Indonesian Muslims integrates Hindu Bali into Indonesian society defined in terms of 
the national ideology Pancasila. The establishment of Pancasila as a hegemonic 
symbology has led to a new form of parallel pluralism in which all religions are subject 
to state regulation. 
Keywords: Bali, Hinduism, Islam, Female Saints, Pluralism, State Symbologies 
 
Abstrak: Makalah ini menggambarkan dua bentuk keragaman beragama masyarakat di 
Bali. Yang pertama adalah  keragaman adaptif di mana unsur-unsur Islam tergabung 
dalam kerajaan pra-modern Bali. Analisa berfokus pada saat di mana Gusti Ayu Made 
Rai, seorang puteri kerajaan Bali abad kedelapan belas menjadi Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, 
salah seorang wanita Muslim yang dianggap wali di Indonesia. Hal ini mengarah kepada 
wacana alternatif tentang sejarah agama orang Bali, yang berlawanan dengan 
pandangan yang meyakini bahwa Bali merupakan tradisi Hindu yang statis secara 
monolitis. Alih-alih menutup diri saat wilayah-wilayah di sekitarnya memeluk Islam, 
kerajaan-kerajaan Bali merangkul kaum Muslim dan ajaran Islam dalam kisah-kisah dan 
kawasan-kawasan sakral. Saat ini strategi integratif tersebut hanya berfungsi di tingkat 
lokal. Para peziarah Muslim Indonesia ke makam Sang Puteri menyatukan Bali Hindu ke 
dalam masyarakat Indonesia mempertegas ideologi nasional Pancasila. Pembentukan 
Pancasila sebagai sebuah simbologi hegemoni telah mengarah kepada bentuk baru 
keragaman paralel di mana semua agama tunduk kepada peraturan negara. 
Kata Kunci: Bali, Hinduisme, Islam, Wali perempuan, Keberagaman, Simbol-simbol 
Negara. 
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This paper describes two modes of 
Balinese and Indonesian religious 
pluralism:  Adaptive pluralism in which 
elements of Islam were incorporated 
into pre-modern Balinese states. 
Analysis focuses on the transformation 
Gusti Ayu Made Rai, an eighteenth-
century Hindu Balinese princess into 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, an Indonesian 
Muslim saint. Parallel pluralism in 
which religions are subordinated to the 
Indonesian state ideology Pancasila. 
This process involved the 
transformation of Balinese Hinduism, 
bringing it into conformity with 
Pancasila monotheism. Puja Mandala, an 
inter-faith religious complex in Kuta 
that is more Indonesian than Balinese. 
 
Religious Pluralism 
Pluralism is social and political 
validation of religious diversity. It takes 
many forms and is located in many 
different social and political contexts. At 
least, it requires recognition of diversity 
as a social fact.1 Religious pluralism can 
be approached from at least two 
perspectives. One is internal to an 
abstract variety of religious thought 
concerning the problem of how moral 
individuals and just societies based 
shared behavioural standards but with 
mutually exclusive metaphysical 
postulates.  A second brackets 
philosophical considerations and is 
concerned with managing diversity to 
avoid communal conflict.  Eck refers to 
this distinction as that between 
“theological” and “civic” pluralism.2  
                                                     
1 Durkheim defines social facts as: "a 
category of facts which present very special 
characteristics: they consist of manners of 
acting, thinking, and feeling external to the 
individual, which are invested with a coercive 
power by virtue of which they exercise control 
over him." Durkheim, E., The Rules of 
Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 
1895/1982) 
2 Eck, D., “Prospects for Pluralism: Voice 
Theological pluralism is 
commitment to the premise that 
religions are alternative narratives and 
symbolic systems speaking to a common 
truth. It has emerged in socio-political 
contexts including contemporary 
secular democracies and Muslim 
monarchies in 12th century Spain. 
Examples include Christian theologian 
John Hicks (1922-2012) and Muslim 
mystic Ibn al-Arabi (1185-1240).3 Hicks 
came to this position pondering the 
question of how a just God could punish 
moral people who do not accept the 
totality of his teachings.  His pluralistic 
hypothesis presumes that all religions 
are authentic, manifestations of “The 
Real.” Differences, even on fundamental 
questions concerning the nature of the 
afterlife, are the consequence of the 
inability of humans to fully comprehend 
this reality.4 Ibn al-Arabi arrived at 
similar conclusion based on his monistic 
conception of Allah and the related 
position that contradictory 
understandings of reality are 
emanations from divine reality. Hence 
his conclusion that Allah can be found in 
churches, synagogues and temples as 
easily as in mosques.5  
There are few instances of states 
adopting theological pluralism a 
                                                                            
and Vision in the Study of Religion”, (Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion, 2007). 
3 Hick, J., Christianity and Other 
Religions: Selected Readings (London: One 
World, 2001). Chittick, W., Ibn al-Arabi’s 
Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of 
Knowledge, Albany”, (State University of New 
York Press, 1989). 
4 Hick, J., An Interpretation of Religion 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) 
5  Chittick, W., “A Sufi Approach to 
Religious Diversity: Ibn al-Arabi on the 
Metaphysics of Revelation”, (1991) In:  Nasr, S. 
and Stoddart, W., Religion of the Heart: Essays 
Presented to Frithjor Schuon on His Eightieth 
Birthday (Washington D.C.: Foundation for 
Traditional Studies). 
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strategy for regulating religion.6  The 
Mughal emperor Akbar (1542-1605) 
was a patron of India’s many faiths and 
in 1582 founded Din i Ilahi (Divine 
Faith) combining elements of Hinduism, 
Islam, Christianity and Zoroastrianism.7  
Akbar’s intentions were as much 
political as religious.  The establishment 
of Din i Ilahi was part of a more general 
strategy to use theological pluralism to 
guard religious harmony in a multi-
religious empire governed by a Muslim 
minority.8 
Civic pluralism is not concerned 
with truth claims. It is the recognition 
that multiple religious groups are 
legitimate social and political actors. 
Civic pluralism allows religious 
communities to coexist peacefully even 
while disagreeing on basic religious 
issues. It can be an effective strategy for 
managing religion because it does not 
require people to compromise high level 
metaphysical assumptions.9 While 
theological pluralisms share a common 
logic, there are many possible civic 
pluralisms. This paper considers two 
forms of Balinese civic pluralism:  
additive pluralism that incorporated 
Islam and Muslims into Hindu-Balinese 
states and parallel pluralism that 
subordinates Islam to both the religious 
framework of the Indonesian state and 
the local dominance of Balinese Hindus.  
                                                     
6 Berger, P., “The Political Management 
of Pluralism”, (Society, 2014). 
7 Habib, I., Akbar and His India (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
8 Roy, C., The Din-i-Ilahi or The Religion 
of Akbar, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 
1941). 
9  Conversations I have had with 
Indonesian Salafis since the 1980s are examples. 
When asked about working jointly with 
Christians, a Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (DDII) leader replied this this was 
possible even though Christians were certain to 
burn in Hell. Another made similar comments 
about Muslims who engage in religious practices 
such as visiting graves that many Salafis 
consider to be unbelief.  
Additive civic pluralism is based 
on the set theoretical concept of 
intersection. It identifies traits shared 
by two bounded sets. Public validation 
of this intersection provides legitimacy. 
The Balinese Hindu polity identified an 
intersection with Islam and absorbed it 
in much the same way that successive 
western monotheisms (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam) absorbed 
elements of antecedent traditions. 
Parallel pluralism is a social formation 
in which two bounded, non-intersecting 
traditions are incorporated into a larger 
structure defined by the union of two 
(or more) sets that are subordinated to 
a higher order symbolic structure.   Both 
problematize concepts of pluralism 
rooted in the social sciences and 
religious studies. The first case 
demonstrates that the boundary 
between civic and theological pluralism 
is not always entirely clear because it 
builds on limited religious 
commonalities. The second 
demonstrates that pluralism is not 
necessarily rooted in shared religious 
beliefs. 
 
Balinese Hinduism and Orientalist 
Romanticism  
Bali is often called the “Island of 
the Gods.” Western representations of 
Bali have been tinged with romantic 
longing since the days of the 
Netherlands East India Company.10  
Tropes of Rousseau’s “noble savage” 
and a longing for an other than Muslim 
Indonesia are the implicit subtexts of 
much of the academic and popular 
writing about Balinese religion and 
culture. Bali is often seen as a Hindu 
island in a sea of Islam and as a 
                                                     
10 Boone, J., The Anthropological 
Romance of Bali 1597-1972: Dynamic 
Perspectives in Marriage and Caste, Politics and 
Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972). 
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fossilized version of what Java used to 
be. 11 Vickers mentions that the first 
Dutch mariners to visit Bali were 
pleased to discover that Balinese, unlike 
Turkish Muslims, ate pork and unlike 
Portuguese Roman Catholics, did not 
fast on Fridays.12 These cultural 
similarities led them to conclude 
(incorrectly) that Balinese kingdoms 
were  natural allies in their struggle 
against these rivals and Muslim 
Mataram.13   Following Raffles’ lead, 
generations of orientalists described the 
Bali  as  a refuge from the fall of the 
Hindu-Javanese kingdom Majapahit to 
“Goth-like Muslims.”14 Dutch 
Orientalism constructed an illusionary 
image of Bali as “Little India” to impede 
the spread of Islam and the growth of 
nationalism in the same way that Raffles 
constructed an image of a less than 
Islamic Java and Singapore as nothing 
                                                     
11 Geertz, C., Local Knowledge: Further 
Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: 
Basic Books, 1985). 
12 The Ottomans, Portuguese, British 
and Dutch were rivals for control of the 
Southeast Asian spice trade. On the Ottoman 
presence in Southeast Asia see: Peacock, A. and 
Gallop, A., From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, 
Turks, and Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015); and Bulut, M., “The Role 
of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial 
Integration between the Levant and Atlantic in 
the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient, 
2002); Tulips, long iconic of Dutch culture, were 
originally imported from Ottoman Turkey 
where they were national symbols. See: 
Theunissen, H, and Roding, M. (eds.) The Tulip, A 
Symbol of Two Nations (Utrecht: Istanbul Turco-
Dutch Friendship Association Press, 1993). The 
world’s greatest spice market was, and still is, in 
Istanbul. 
13 Vickers, A., “Hinduism and Islam in 
Indonesia: Bali and the Pasisir World”, 
(Indonesia, 1987). 
14 Raffles, T., The history of Java 
(London: Black, 1917), Parbury, and Allen, Day, 
A., "Islam and Literature in South-East Asia: 
Some Pre-Modern, Mainly Javanese 
Perspectives", (1983); in: Islam in South-Eat 
Asia, Hooker, M., Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
more than a fishing village to support of  
his expansionist colonialist policies in 
the early nineteenth century.15  Since 
the  1920’s Bali has been depicted as “a 
utopia where tired Europe could refresh 
itself and find spiritual harmony.”16 
Geertz and others fixed this image in 
anthropological imagination, depicting 
Bali as a tranquil, agrarian civilization 
obsessed with ritual and the performing 
arts, self-consciously distancing itself 
from its political and economic 
environments and the Islamicate 
civilizations surrounding it.17 Geertz’s 
description of Balinese kingdoms as 
“theatre states” replicating the Hindu-
Balinese cosmos and  more concerned 
with ritual than realpolitik builds on this 
Orientalist tradition.18  
Romanticized representations of 
“exotic” cultures rarely stand up to close 
scrutiny. Vickers and Andaya have 
shown that far from being bastions of a 
besieged Indic civilization, pre-colonial 
Balinese states were engaged with 
neighbouring Muslim states. They also 
supported the development of Muslim 
communities. Here, I carry this analysis 
a step further, showing that Muslim 
themes, symbols and at least one saint, 
were incorporated into the symbology 
of Hindu-Balinese kingdoms.  
 
 
                                                     
15 Guermonprez, J., “La Religion 
Balinaise dans le Miroir de Hindouism”, 
(Bulletin de Ecole Frangaise d'Extreme Orient, 
2001). Smith, B. and Woodward, M., 
Decolonizing Islam and Feminism, (2014) in: 
Smith, B. and Woodward, M., Gender and Power 
in Indonesian Islam: Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and 
Pesantren Selves (London: Routledge, 2014). 
16 Vickers, A., Bali: A Paradise Created 
(North Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing, 2012). 
17 Geertz, C., “Person Time and Conduct 
in Bali: An Essay in Cultural Analysis”, 
(American Anthropologist, 1967); Lansing, S., 
Three Worlds of Bali, (New York: Praeger, 1983). 
18  Geertz, C., Negara: The Theatre State 
in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981). 
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Theoretical Perspectives 
Theoretical myopia is among the 
challenges confronting analysis of 
cultural complexity. It often leads to 
neglect of elements of complexity that 
cannot be explained by a single theory. 
Here I rely on struc vturalist theory in 
the analysis of the spatial orientation of 
Hindu-Balinese states and performance 
theory in the analysis of how a Balinese 
Hindu space is transformed to 
incorporate Islam. These approaches 
are united by an overarching complexity 
theory based model of state systems 
including three components: 1.) 
Symbologies: institutionalized meaning 
systems including narratives, symbols 
and rituals that establish legitimacy a; 
2.) Technologies security forces, 
education, infrastructure; 3.) Identity 
spaces that includes face to face and 
imagined communities that support, 
contest for, or elude symbologies and 
technologies.19 
 
Sacred Geography and Indianized 
States 
The equation of microcosm and 
macrocosm in a basic structural 
principle the “Indianized States” of 
Southeast Asia.20 Heine-Geldern 
scholars following him have taken this 
cosmic equation as a point of departure 
for exploring the dynamics of Southeast 
Asian states.21 States, palaces and 
                                                     
19 This is a slightly modified version of a 
model developed by Liu, Fisher-Onar and 
Woodward.  Liu, J., Fisher-Onar, N. and 
Woodward, M., “Critical junctures? Complexity 
and the Post-Colonial Nation-state”, 
(International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 
2014). 
20 Coedes, G., The Indianized States of 
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1968). 
21 Heine-Geldern, R., (1930) “Weltbild 
und Bauform in Südostasien'”, (Wener Beitrage 
zur Kunst- und Kulturgeschichte Asiens, 1930); 
Conceptions of Sate and Kingship in Southeast 
temples were constructed as mandala, a 
central point surrounded by multiples of 
four at cardinal and directions, 
replicating Buddhist or Hindu 
cosmologies. Kings were incarnations of 
Hindu gods (Devaraja) or just kings who 
rule in accordance with Buddhist 
teachings (Dharmaraja).22 Tambiah calls 
these kingdoms “Galactic Polities.” They 
were totalizing institutions in which 
administrative and other aspects of 
state technologies and identity spaces 
are subordinated to and structured in 
terms of symbologies. 23   Balinese states 
were exceptional only because of the 
extent to which this pattern of spatial 
pervades daily life.24  
Premodern Southeast Asian states 
were, however, more than replicas of 
Indian prototypes. In most instances, 
Southeast Asian Galactic Polities 
absorbed elements of non-dominant 
religions as components of sacred 
geography and state ceremonies. In 
Burma, indigenous spirits (nat), some 
believed to be reincarnations of foreign 
Muslims, figured significantly in sacred 
geography and popular Buddhist 
piety.25 In Burma and Thailand Hindu 
                                                                            
Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia 
Program, 1956). 
22  On Devaraja see: Kulke, H., The 
Devaraja Cult (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Southeast Asia Program, 1978); On Dharmaraja 
see:  Smith, B., (ed.) Religion and Legitimation of 
Power in Thailand, Laos, and Burma, 
(Chambersburg: ANIMA, 1978). 
23 Tambiah, S., “The Galactic Polity in 
Southeast Asia”. In Culture, Thought, and Social 
Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1973); World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A 
Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against 
a Historical Background (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977). 
24 Hauser-Schäublin, B., “The Politics of 
Sacred Space; Using Conceptual Models of Space 
for Socio-political Transformations in Bali”, 
(Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 
2004). 
25 Brown, G., “The Taungbyon Festival, 
Burma”, (The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and 
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Brahmins played vital roles in state 
ceremonies. This still the case in the 
modern Thai kingdom.26 The 15th-18th 
century Arakanese kingdom Mrauk U 
carried this integrative tendency further 
than most. While it was primarily 
Buddhist, Muslim scholars and 
symbolism were fully incorporated into 
the royal cult of glory.27 It should, 
therefore, come as no surprise that 
Balinese kingdoms drew on Muslim as 
well as Hindu sources of legitimacy and 
provided for the establishment of 
Muslim shrines and communities, and in 
so doing, establishing multi-religious 
Galactic Polities.  
 
Ritual and Social Transformations 
Victor Turner is known best for his 
theories of the transformative power of 
ritual and social dramas. Rites of 
passage are rituals that move people 
from one position to another in well-
defined social structures. Social dramas 
transform societies at critical junctures 
in social and political history. Critical 
junctures are points in time where 
significant reconfiguration of system 
parameters is possible, necessary and in 
some cases inevitable. They range for 
critical points in the lives of important 
individuals to cataclysmic events such 
as state failures leading to the 
reconfiguration of social systems. 
Rites of passage mark critical 
transitions in the life cycle including 
birth, puberty, marriage and death. 
Analogous rituals mark entry into 
                                                                            
Ireland, 1915); Spiro, M., Burmese 
Supernaturalism (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1967); Woodward, Mark, “When One 
Wheel Stops: Theravada Buddhism and the 
British Raj in Upper Burma”, (Crossroads, 1988). 
26 Quaritch-Wales, H., Siamese State 
Ceremonies: Their History and Function (London: 
Bernard Quaritch, 1931). 
27 Gutman, P., “Symbolism of Kingship in 
Arakan,” in:  Marr, D. and Milner, A. Southeast 
Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries (Singapore: 
Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986). 
structured social groups ranging from 
the military to social clubs.  Turner 
describes three phases common to most 
rites of passage: 1.) separation, in which 
previously existing social roles are 
dissolved, 2.) a period of liminality 
marked by the absence of well-defined 
social roles in which initiates receive 
instruction, and 3.) reintegration where 
they assume new social roles.28 Here I 
use this model to explain the process 
through which Gusti Ayu Made Rai 
became not only a Muslim but also an 
exemplary Muslim woman and a saint 
or friend of Allah. 
In his analysis of social dramas 
Turner develops a theory of social 
transformation based on the 
performative structure of conflict 
situations.29 His model includes four 
stages: 1.) breach; 2.) crisis; 3.) redress; 
and 4.) reintegration. He is especially 
concerned with the third phase which is 
characterized by reflexivity. Here social 
actors reconsider the structure of social 
institutions and consider options for 
reintegration. Turner’s model is 
incomplete and overly optimistic 
because it does not allow for the 
possibility that reflexivity and redress 
may fail, leading to the renewal of 
conflict or that the social restructuring it 
produces will sow the seeds of future 
conflict. Another less than optimal 
outcome is that reintegration efforts will 
become irrelevant because of 
unforeseeable social or political change. 
This appears to be the true in the case of 
Siti Khotijah. The seventeenth century 
restructuring of the sacred geography 
and symbology of Badung does not 
provide an adequate model for 
maintaining Hindu-Muslim congeniality 
                                                     
28 Turner, V., The Ritual Process: 
Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine, 
1969). 
29 Turner, V., Dramas, Fields and 
Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). 
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in contemporary Bali.  
 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, the Balinese 
Galactic Polity, Social Transformation 
and Additive Pluralism 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah was a 
princess from the kingdom of Badung in 
the Denpasar area. Her tomb is a 
pilgrimage site for Hindus and Muslims. 
There are thousands of Muslim holy 
(keramat) graves throughout Indonesia. 
Pilgrimage (ziyarah) to them is an 
element of traditional Southeast Asian 
Islam.  Some are of only local 
significance. Others, especially those of 
the Wali Songo, the nine saints 
instrumental in establishing Islam as the 
religion of Java, attract millions of 
pilgrims from throughout Indonesia and 
neighbouring countries.30  Women are 
buried at many of these shrines, most 
often because they are the wives or 
daughters of the male saint. Quinn 
estimates that there are no more than a 
dozen widely recognized women saints 
in all of Indonesia.31 The fact that there 
is a steady stream of buses bringing 
pilgrims from Java to Siti Khotijah’s 
tomb indicates that she has become a 
national phenomenon.  Her tomb is 
located in a walled compound inside a 
                                                     
30 On the Wali Songo see: Sunyoto, 
Agus., Atlas Wali Songo: Buku Pertama yang 
Mengungkap Wali Songo Sebagai Fakta Sejarah 
(Depok: Pustaka IIMaN, 2014); Quinn, G., 
“Throwing Money at the Holy Door”, (2007) In: 
Greg Fealy, G. and White, S., (eds.) Expressing 
Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; 
Rinkes, D., Nine Saints of Java (Malaysian Kuala 
Lumpur: Sociological Research Institute, 1996); 
Woodward, M., “Jerusalem in Java,” In: Adelman, 
M. and Elman, M., Jerusalem: Conflict and 
Cooperation in a Contested City (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1994). 
31 Quinn, G., The Veneration of Female 
Saints in Indonesia, in: Joseph, S. et. al. (eds.) 
Encyclopaedia of Women and Islamic Cultures 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012). 
Hindu cemetery in the Pemecutan 
district of Denpasar and is known as 
“Keramat Agung Pemecutan” (The Great 
Holy Place of Pemecutan).  
There are several versions of her 
sacred biography.32 Here, I rely 
primarily on one included in a booklet 
by Mangku I Made Puger and 
conversations with him.  He is the 
current caretaker (juru cunci) of the 
shrine and distributes the booklet to 
Muslim and Hindu pilgrims. I 
supplement these accounts with 
materials collected from Muslim and 
Hindu pilgrims themselves. 
The section describing Gusti Ayu 
Made Rai can be analysed as a rite of 
passage. It begins with a description of 
her social position as a Balinese Hindu 
princess and a health crisis that led to 
her transformation into a Madurese 
Muslim queen. 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah was born 
Gusti Ayu Made Rai or Raden Ayu 
Pemecutan in the mid-seventeenth 
century. She was the daughter of the 
Balinese king of Badung, I Gusti Ngurah 
Gede Pemecutan, who was also the 
founder of the modern city of Denpasar. 
The exact dates of her birth and death 
are not known.  
There are at least two accounts of 
how she came to be a Muslim. The one 
most commonly told to Muslim pilgrims 
visiting her grave and which is included 
in Mangku I Made Puger’s booklet is: 
When she was a young woman, 
Raden Ayu Pemecutan became 
                                                     
32 I refer to this as a “sacred biography” 
because it cannot be independently verified. 
Historians are inclined to dismiss scared 
biographies as “pious fictions.” Regardless of the 
degree to which they include accurate accounts 
of the lives of actual individuals, they are 
enormously important in the lived experience of 
religion. People who value them do not merely 
believe them to be true. They know them it be 
factual. On the concept of sacred biography see: 
Heffernan, T., Sacred Biography: Saints and Their 
Biographers in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
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seriously ill with hepatitis.  None of 
the Balinese healers could cure the 
disease. They tried various 
traditional medicines including 
antidotes for poison and efforts to 
combat sorcery, but none of them 
were successful.33 The king went to 
meditate (tapa semadi) at a holy 
place located inside the palace. He 
received a pawisik (message) that 
he should hold a competition to see 
who could cure his daughter. The 
following day he ordered the prime 
minister to prepare an 
announcement of a competition 
not only for the people of Badung, 
but also for all of Bali and 
kingdoms outside Bali. The 
announcement stated: “Whoever 
can treat and cure my child: If it is 
a woman she will be the king’s 
adopted daughter. If it is a man and 
the two are soul mates they will be 
married.” 
This came to the attention of an 
ulama/syech from Yogyakarta. This 
ulama was a person with great 
mystical knowledge (ilmu 
kebatinan). Pangeran 
Cakrangingrat IV (1718-1746) of 
the Madurese kingdom of 
Bangkalan was his student and 
close associate.34 The syech sent 
him a message instructing him to 
come to Yogyakarta as quickly as 
possible. After receiving the 
message from his teacher, 
Pangeran Cakrangingrat came to 
Yogyakarta with forty soldiers. 
When he arrived, the prince 
appeared before his teacher and 
asked him what had happened. The 
syech told him what he had 
received a message from the King 
of Pemecutan in Bali. He then 
ordered the prince to go to Bali to 
meet the king. 
Pangeran Cakrangingrat IV said 
farewell to and asked for blessing 
(pamit dan mohon doa restu) from 
his teacher before leaving for Bali. 
                                                     
33 Another version of the story does not 
mention the miraculous healing and states that 
the king gave Raden Ayu Pemecutan in marriage 
to the Madurese prince after he provide 
assistance in a war against a rival kingdom. 
34 The Sultanate of Yogyakarta was not 
established until 1755. 
When he arrived at Pemecutan he 
presented himself to the king, who 
received him warmly. The prince 
asked what had happened and how 
he could help. The king explained 
that his daughter Gusti Ayu Made 
Rai had been suffering from 
hepatitis for several years. He 
asked if the prince could treat and 
cure the illness his daughter was 
suffering from. The prince replied 
that he would do what the king had 
asked.35 
The king summoned his beloved 
daughter and introduced her to 
Pangeran Cakrangingrat. From the 
moment she met him the princess’s 
heart trembled and the treatment 
began. After several treatments, 
the illness she had suffered from 
for years began to be cured. She 
revealed the feelings of her heart 
to her father. 
The king called Pangeran 
Cakrangingrat to appear before 
him and in their meeting thanked 
him for his help treating and curing 
his daughter and asked if he had 
fallen in love with her. Pangeran 
Cakrangingrat replied that from 
their first meeting he had been 
entranced with the princess and 
that he loved her. Recognizing that 
their feelings were the same, the 
two were married in the 
Pemecutan palace in the presence 
of the prince’s forty bodyguards 
and the entire royal family of 
Pemecutan.  
Her marriage and journey to 
Madura with her husband marks 
the first of the stages, separation, 
in Turner’s model of rites of 
passage. In this instance, the 
separation is geographic – out of 
Bali – and socio-religious – out of 
Hinduism 
The prince then asked permission 
to return to Bangkalan with his 
                                                     
35 Vickers (1987) op. cit. mentions that 
in some areas in Bali Muslims are highly 
regarded as healers. It seems unlikely that a 
monarch would have undertaken such a 
journey. The tale is however congruent with 
Balinese understandings of Muslims as healers. 
It is reasonable to suggest that the ranks and 
titles of some of the characters in the story were 
inflated to enhance its prestige.  
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wife.  
 
What follows is the second, liminal, 
phase in which she learns about Islam. 
This is not described in detail.  It is 
simply stated that: 
Gusti Ayu Made Rai became a 
Muslim and changed her name to 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah.36  
Her reincorporation and subsequent 
new position as a proper seventeenth 
century Muslim woman are described in 
greater detail. 
After embracing Islam, she became 
very devoted the Shari’ah including 
praying five times per day. Even 
though she was Pangeran 
Cakrangingrat’s fourth wife, she 
lived harmoniously with the 
others. As a Muslim, she was very 
devoted to pengajian (religious 
talks) dakwah (propagation of 
Islam) and other religious 
activities.37  
 
Social Drama, Siti Khotijah and the 
Reconfiguration of Badung’s Sacred 
Geography 
  
Setting the Stage 
The next section of the text sets 
the stage for the social drama leading to 
the reconfiguration of Badung’s 
symbology. The stage for this social 
drama is the palace (puri) of Badung. 
The sacred geography of a Balinese 
palace is based on the kahyangan tiga 
(three temples) system that also 
structures villages and domestic 
compounds. It includes three principle 
shrines: 1.) The household shrine or 
temple of origin (pura puseh) where 
                                                     
36  The name chose for her was that of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s first wife Khadijah 
who is commonly known as the “Mother of the 
Believers.” 
37 Here she is depicted as the ideal 
traditional Muslim woman. Wives living 
harmoniously in plural marriages is an ideal that 
is frequently not a social reality. 
purified ancestors are located; 2.) Living 
quarters (pura desa) and 3.) The death 
temple/cemetery (pura dalem). They 
are structured by a hierarchy of purity, 
the most impure being the pura desa 
and the purest the pura puseh. The pura 
desa occupies an intermediate 
position.38 Hobart shows that the life 
cycle is conceptualized as movement 
from the pura puseh where rites for 
new-borns a performed, through the 
pura desa where the child comes to 
adulthood and with death to the pura 
dalem. The maligia ritual is performed 
to purify the souls of the dead, often 
long after they have been cremated, and 
return them to the pura puseh. 
After living with her husband for 
many years she finally became 
homesick for the father, mother 
and family. She came before her 
husband to ask his blessing and 
permission to visit them. Pangeran 
Cakrangingrat understood her 
desires very well. Although he had 
heavy duties and obligations he 
granted Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah 
permission to visit her father, 
mother and family in Pemecutan. 
He ordered some of his 
bodyguards and ladies of the court 
to accompany her on the journey 
to Bali. Forty of these male and 
female attendants accompanied 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah on her 
journey even though Pangeran 
Cakrangingrat did not. Before 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah left he 
gave her a ceramic jar, a keris 
(dagger) and several pusaka 
(sacred heirlooms) that she 
concealed in her hair. Then Raden 
Ayu Siti Khotijah and her 
companions left on their journey to 
Bali. 
At the time Raden Ayu Siti 
Khotijah left Bangkalan to visit 
Bali, the Pemecutan kingdom was 
preparing for the large maligia 
ritual the purpose of which is to 
purify the spirits of the dead. This 
was an auspicious time for her to 
                                                     
38 Hauser-Schäublin op. cit. 
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visit and meet with her family. 39 
When she and her companions 
arrived in Pemecutan her family 
greeted them warmly. Raden Ayu 
Siti Khotijah slept in the palace 
(pura desa) while her companions 
stayed in the adjacent courtyard.  
 
 
The Breach 
A breach, the first stage in Turner’ 
model of social drams, occurs because 
there is no place for Muslim piety in the 
confines of Hindu-Balinese sacred space. 
Siti Khotijah’s attempt to appropriate 
the Badung pura puseh for Muslim 
purposes leads to the illusion of a 
symbolic reversal in which Muslim piety 
is (mis) understood as Balinese 
sorcery.40 
Because she had become a Muslim, 
when the time for the evening prayer 
(maghrib) came, she prayed in the 
sacred place (pura puseh) inside the 
palace. She prayed wearing a white 
mukena (women’s prayer garment) 
facing west in the direction of the kiblat 
(Mecca). The prime minister saw her 
praying without a prayer rug. What he 
saw surprised him because very few 
people in Bali had ever seen a Muslim 
pray. The prime minister thought that 
she was practicing black magic (ilmu 
hitam/ngeleak).41  
                                                     
39 See: Wiener, M., Visible and Invisible 
Realms: Power, Magic and Colonial Conquest in 
Bali (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994). 
40 On symbolic reversal and witchcraft 
see: Babcock, B., (ed.) The Reversible World: 
Symbolic Inversion in Art and Society (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1978) On witchcraft 
and symbolic reversals see: Ginzburg, G. The 
Night Battles: Witches and Agrarian Cults in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
41 Balinese believe than many physical 
and mental illnesses are caused by witchcraft. 
Intense fear of witches (leyak) is common in all 
social strata. Conflict between Rangda, the 
queen of the leyak, and Barong, a lion spirit, is a 
common theme in Balinese literary and 
 
The Crisis 
A crisis, the second stage in 
Turner’s model, ensues when Siti 
Khotijah’s breach of Hindu Balinese 
custom and intrusion of Muslim ritual 
into Hindu space is discovered. Her 
father responds in a violent manner, 
though one appropriate given the 
religious assumptions on which 
Balinese concepts of sacred space are 
based. 
The prime minister reported what 
he had seen to the king. After he 
received the report and then saw 
her praying himself, the king was 
very angry. Without asking Raden 
Ayu Siti Khotijah what she was 
doing, he ordered the prime 
minister to take her to the 
graveyard (pura dalem) together 
with the bodyguards and the 
female companions who had come 
with her from Bangkalan.  
 
Redress and Reflexivity 
The critical redress/reflexivity 
stage commences when she responds to 
her father’s accusations and acquiesces 
to his verdict.  
When they arrived at the graveyard, 
Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah addressed the 
prime minister.  
My uncle the prime minister, I have 
the feeling, I already know, that I 
have been brought here to be 
killed. Because this is my father’s 
order as the king and authority, 
please, uncle prime minister, carry 
out his order. 
Know uncle prime minister that I 
was praying in the holy place 
according the practice of the 
                                                                            
performance traditions.  Stephen, M., 
"Witchcraft, Grief, and the Ambivalence of 
Emotions", (American Ethnologist, 1999); Mead, 
M. and Bateson, G., Trance and Dance in Bali 
(Washington DC: United States Library of 
Congress, 1951). Rangda is usually depicted as a 
woman very long flowing white hair that could 
be confused with a mukena. A leyak practicing 
black magic in the pura puseh is a symbolic 
reversal that Balinese might well find horrifying.  
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religion that I believe in, Islam. I 
was fulfilling the ritual 
requirements of my religion. 
This was her message to the prime 
minister: 
Do not kill me with a sharp weapon 
because I cannot be killed in that 
way. Instead use my hairpin. It has 
been wrapped in a betel leaf 
decorated with the colours of the 
Tri Datu -- black, white and red. 
(This symbolizes the three Hindu 
gods: Brahma, Visnu and Siva.)42 
Stick it in the left side of my 
chest. After I am dead, smoke will 
come out from my body. If it smells 
bad, please uncle prime minister, 
just bury me. But if the smoke that 
comes out of my body smells 
sweet, please build me a holy place 
to be known as keramat. 
After Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah said 
this and had conveyed her message 
to the prime minister she gave the 
hair pin to him.  She raised her 
hands in sembah (both hands held 
together in front of the face) to 
Allah.  She asked the prime 
minister to stab the left side of her 
chest with the hairpin. 
 
This indicates that Siti Khotijah 
understood that the incompatibility of 
Muslim piety and Hindu sacred 
geography. She accepts death but in so 
doing proposes restructuring the 
Badung galactic polity.43 
Then, the prime minister stabbed 
her in the left side of the chest with 
the hairpin. She fell down, 
breathing her last breath.  Very 
sweet smoke smelling like honey 
and Arabian incense came from 
her body and filled the entire 
Badung graveyard that is eleven 
hectares in size so that it smelled 
very sweet.44  
 
                                                     
42 This is the only reference to Hindu 
concepts in the text. 
43  This type of confusion would not 
have happened in Klungkung because there is a 
mosque located inside the palace.  
44 An alternative version of the story is 
that she was stabbed in the back with a spear. 
This passage shows that Raden 
Ayu Siti Khotijah has become not just a 
Muslim, but also a saint. She did not 
fear, and indeed embraced, death and 
had at least limited powers of 
invulnerability. This is in keeping with 
Javanese and Madurese traditions 
concerning the invulnerability of saints 
and the teachings of many Sufi masters 
who understood death as a step on the 
journey to Allah.  Schimmel quotes the 
ninth century woman saint Rabia al 
Adawiyya in her comments on Sufi 
understandings of death. 
Rabia taught that the believers 
should love God not from hope or fear 
but for the sake of his own eternal 
beauty: out of pure love. “The lovers of 
God no longer dreaded death but rather 
longed for it, for death is a bridge that 
leads the lover to the beloved.”45 
The idea that the bodies of saints 
are fragrant, smelling of flowers and 
incense is also deeply rooted in Middle 
Eastern and Southeast Asian Sufism.46  It 
is often said that the bodies of Muslim 
saints smell of flowers and incense a 
belief that can be traced to Prophetic 
traditions about the fragrance of the 
Prophet Muhammad.47  Javanese Sufi 
texts and tradition also mention the 
limited invulnerability of the fifteenth 
century saintly martyr Syech Siti Jenar 
and sweet smell of his corpse.48 The 
                                                     
45 Schimmel, A., Rumi’s World: The Life 
and Work of the Great Sufi Poet (Boulder: 
Shambhala Publications, 2001). 
46 Asher, B., “The Sufi Shrines of Shahul 
Hamid in India and Southeast Asia”, (Artibus 
Asie, 2009). 
47 Thurlkill, M., Sacred Scents in Early 
Christianity and Islam (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 2016). 
48 Syech Siti Jenar is sometimes 
considered to have been one of the Wali Songo. 
He was executed for openly proclaiming the 
mystical truth of Ibn al-Arabi’s teaching of 
waḥdat al-wujūd, the unity of the divine essence 
and the human soul, Hadisuwarno, S., Biografi 
Lengkap Syekh Siti Jenar (Yogyakarta: Laksana, 
2018). In this respect, Siti Jenar resembles 
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smell of incense (menyan)  and flowers 
is associated with purity and holiness. 
Pilgrims visiting holy graves often burn 
it. This would also appear to connect the 
story of Raden Ayu Siti Khadija’s death 
with the Balinese Hindu maligia ritual. 
There is, however, a stark contrast 
between the fragrance of her body 
(purity) and the foul smell of Balinese 
cemeteries that are used as cremation 
grounds (impurity).49  However, Siti 
Khatija’s spirit does not require 
purification because she has become a 
saint and has been purified in life in 
ways that are not possible in Balinese 
Hinduism. 
 
Reintegration 
Reintegration, the final stage in 
Turner’s model, involves the 
construction of purified Muslim space 
within the defile space of the Hindu 
pura dalem. It transforms Badung 
symbology by creating a Muslim enclave 
in the Hindu-Balinese Galactic Polity. It 
also redefines the identity space of the 
Balinese kingdom through the creation 
of formally recognized Muslim 
residential spaces. 
Some of the people who 
accompanied her cried hysterically and 
others fainted. Later that evening 
Muslim funeral prayers were held and 
her body was buried. When this was 
finished the prime minister and Raden 
Ayu Siti Khotijah’s companions 
presented themselves to the king of 
Pemecutan. The prime minister 
                                                                            
Mansur al-Hallaj, the Persian Sufi executed in 
Baghdad in 922. There is not, however, a direct 
historical connection between them, Feener, M., 
“A Re-examination of the Place of al-Hallaj in the 
Development of Southeast Asian Islam”, 
(Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 
1998). 
49 Balinese bury their dead until they 
have sufficient resources to cremate them. 
When a wealthy and powerful person is 
cremated, the bodies of relatives and retainers 
are often cremated with him/her. 
conveyed Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah’s 
words and the message she gave before 
she died to the king. 
The king appointed a juru kunci 
(care taker) for her grave and ordered 
that he and his descendants should care 
for it. 
The man chosen for these tasks 
was a Hindu. The current care taker, 
Mangku I Made Puger, is the grandson of 
the first juru kunci. Like his father and 
grandfather, he is a Hindu. He takes his 
responsibility to care for the grave and 
meet the needs of Muslim pilgrims very 
seriously. He explained that he travelled 
to East Java to “learn how to care for 
Muslim graves.” Put in theoretical terms 
he learned the modes of ritual practice 
appropriate for Muslim sacred space. 
The bodyguards and female 
attendants did not return to Bangkalan 
in Madura. They were given land to 
settle on in the area that is now 
Kampung Jawa in North Denpasar and 
Kampung Islam Kepaon in South 
Denpasar.50 
The day after she died, Raden Ayu 
Siti Khotijah’s grave was cleaned and 
the new juru kunci and his wife covered 
it with the flowers used at Javanese and 
Madurese Muslim graves. That night 
there was an unexpected miracle. A tree 
approximately fifty centimetres tall 
grew from Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah’s 
grave. The next morning the juru kunci 
and his wife cut it down, but it grew 
back the next night at the same size and 
in the same place. This happened three 
times. They were not brave enough to 
cut the tree that grew from Raden Ayu 
Siti Khotijah’s grave again. That night 
the juru kunci and his wife meditated 
                                                     
50 Muslims from Java, Sulawesi and 
other parts of Indonesia have settled in these 
kampung. Islam and Muslims were integrated 
into the sacred space of Klungkung is a more 
systematic way. There, the palace is surrounded 
by concentric circles of alternating Hindu and 
Muslim villages. 
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(terakat/ bersemedi) at the grave. While 
meditating they heard Raden Ayu Siti 
Khotijah’s voice and received a message 
from her. 
She said that the tree that had 
grown from the middle of her grave 
should be cared for because it had 
grown from her hair and that Allah 
would grant miracles (mukjizat) and 
blessing (rejeki) to his communities 
(umat) that perform pilgrimage 
(berziyarah) to her grave. Because of 
this message the tree has be honoured 
and well cared for. It is now known as 
the Pohon Rambut (Hair Tree). 
The tree is approximately 16 
meters tall. Like Raden Ayu Siti 
Khotijah’s grave, it is sacred (keramat). 
It is said that its leaves never fall on the 
grave and that they have medicinal 
properties. Mangku I Made Puger 
collects them and gives them to Hindu 
and Muslim pilgrims. 
 
The Grave Complex: Containing 
Muslim Space 
The grave complex is located 
within the Badung pura dalem. Like 
other Balinese cemeteries it is 
overgrown with tree and brush and has 
the appearance of being abandoned. In 
contrast, the compound including Raden 
Ayu Siti Khotijah’s grave is carefully 
maintained.  The grave complex 
includes two walled compounds.  
The outer compound is liminal 
space. It is a passage way from the 
defiled Balinese Hindu space of the pura 
dalem to the purified grave site that can 
be understood as a distinctively Muslim 
pura puseh. This entryway is mixed 
Hindu-Muslim space. There are signs 
indicating that it is the entry to Siti 
Khotijah’s grave, but it is a site for Hindu 
or at least Hindu style devotions.  There 
are statues of Hindu guardian spirits. 
Daily offerings (canang sari) made to 
them are distinctively Balinese. They do 
not resemble those typically presented 
to spirits in Java (sajen). 
The inner compound and the gate 
leading to it are Muslim space. They are 
almost indistinguishable from Muslim 
graves in Java, Madura, elsewhere in 
Indonesia and those in Muslim societies 
in Africa, the Middle East and South 
Asia. The only distinctive feature of Siti 
Khotijah’s grave is the “hair tree” that 
has grown through the roof of the 
enclosure.  Ritual practices associated 
with ziyarah to the grave are entirely 
conventional, including tahlil -- 
rhythmic recitation of the first phrase of 
the Muslim Confession of Faith 
(shahada) La ilaha illa Lah (There is no 
god but God) reciting or reading Surah 
Yasin of the Qur’an and do’a 
(supplications asking Allah for 
assistance), burning incense and 
scattering red and white flowers on the 
tomb.51 Only Muslim pilgrims engage in 
these practices.  Hindu pilgrims pay 
their respects with a sembah. There is 
no apparent blending of devotional 
practices as there are at some Hindu-
Muslim shrines in India.52  Hindus visit 
an unambiguously Muslim shrine 
primarily because of its healing powers. 
 
Contemporary Pilgrimage Practices 
In the eighteenth-century 
narratives concerning Siti Khotijah and 
incorporation of her grave into the 
Badung Galactic polity were local, or at 
most regional, Balinese phenomena. 
Colonialism, post-colonial nation 
building and internal migration have 
transformed Balinese identity spaces. 
                                                     
51 The practices are remarkably uniform 
across otherwise vastly different Muslim 
cultures. I have observed them throughout 
Southeast Asia, in Niger and Nigeria in West 
Africa and in the United Kingdom. 
52  Gold, D., “The Sufi Shrines of Gwalior 
City: Communal Sensibilities and the Accessible 
Exotic under Hindu Rule”, (The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 2005). 
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Bali is far less culturally and political 
autonomous than it was in the 
eighteenth century.  At least fifteen 
percent of the population is now 
Muslim. In Denpasar, some estimates 
place it as high as twenty-five percent. 
Economic opportunity resulting from 
the development of Bali as global tourist 
destination sparked a wave of Muslim 
immigration from East Java, Lombok 
and Madura beginning in the mid-
1980s. This has led to the 
nationalization of pilgrimage to Siti 
Khotijah’s grave and the development of 
a Bali based Muslim pilgrimage 
network. 
Muslim and Hindu Balinese visit 
Siti Khotijah’s shrine individually or in 
small groups. These pilgrimages are 
especially common during Ramadan. 
Larger groups of Balinese Muslims and 
others from Java, Lombok, Madura and 
Sulawesi come to celebrate her 
birthday. These commemorations 
include a large slametan (prayer meal) 
similar to those held in Java. Objects that 
belonged to Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah 
including her prayer rug, sandals, and 
other personal items that are said to be 
charged with barakah (blessing) are 
displayed on these occasions.53 The date 
of these celebrations is fixed by the 
Balinese Pakuwon calendar and occurs 
every 210 days. 
There are larger organized 
pilgrimage tours from Java and 
Sulawesi. Muslim religious leaders 
organize some of these. Java based 
travel agencies specializing in 
pilgrimage tourism organize others. The 
Balinese provincial government actively 
encourages Muslim pilgrimage as part of 
                                                     
53 The practice of displaying items 
belonging to the saint is common throughout the 
Muslim world. Swords and other items 
belonging to the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions are on display at the Topkapi palace 
in Istanbul. Jalaluddin Rumi’s caps and sandals 
are displayed at his shrine in Konya.  
its tourism promotion efforts.  As many 
as twenty of these tours, each of which 
includes as many as two hundred 
pilgrims/tourists, visit the shrine every 
week. Many of these tours also visit 
other Muslim holy sites in Bali, 
especially the graves of the Wali Pitu 
(seven saints) who are said to have been 
influential in spreading Islam in Bali. 
Internationally renowned Muslim 
leaders including Syech Hisham Kabbani 
of the transnational Naqshbandi 
Haqqani Sufi order have also visited the 
shrine.54 As many as twenty of these 
tours, each of which includes as many as 
two hundred pilgrims/tourists, visit the 
shrine every week. Many of these tours 
also visit other Muslim holy sites in Bali, 
especially the graves of the Seven Wali 
who were influential in bringing Islam 
to Bali.  
Pilgrimage to the graves of the 
Wali Pitu emerged in the 1990s. These 
saints were discovered and promoted 
by Toyib Zain Zaen Arif, an Indonesian 
Muslim of Hadhrami Arab descent from 
East Java.55 His program had as much to 
do with bringing Bali into Javanese and 
Hadhrami Islamic identity spaces as 
with bringing Islam into Balinese 
identity space.56 The Wali Pitu are 
modelled on the Javanese Wali Songo 
                                                     
54 Syech Hisham Kabbani has large 
followings in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 
He visits Southeast Asia on a regular basis. 
55  Slama, M., From Wali Songo to Wali 
Pitu: The Traveling of Islamic Saint Veneration to 
Bali (2014) in: Hauser-Schäublin, B. and 
Harnish, D., Between Harmony and 
Discrimination: Negotiating Identities within 
Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and 
Lombok (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
56 On Hadhrami Islam in Indonesia see: 
Alatas, F., Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami 
Diaspora: Problems in Theoretical History (1997) 
in: Freitag, W., Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and 
Statemen in the Indian Ocean 1750s-1960s 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997); and Woodward, M., 
Rohmaniyah, I., Amin, A., Ma’arif, S., Murtaugh 
Coleman, D. and Umar, S., Indonesian Affairs, 
(2013). 
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(nine saints), most of whom are 
believed to have been of Hadhrami 
descent, who were instrumental in 
establishing Islam as the religion of Java.  
Unlike Siti Khotijah, the Wali Pitu do not 
have roots in Balinese history and 
tradition and are more closely 
associated with Javanese tradition. All 
but one is said to have been Hahdramis.  
The seventh is said to have been an 
Indonesian Muslim of Chinese descent. 
 
Contemporary Bali, Indonesian State 
Symbology and Parallel Pluralism 
The additive transformation of the 
Badung Galactic Polity to include 
Muslim space incorporated a Muslim 
minority into Hindu society. It required 
transforming symbologies and 
technologies that legitimize identity 
spaces characterized by ethnic and/or 
religious diversity. Constructing Muslim 
space within the Badung Galactic Polity 
served this purpose. The integration of 
Hindu and Muslim sacred space and 
pilgrimage approaches what Eck calls 
theological pluralism. In the case of Siti 
Khotijah these truth claims are limited 
to belief in the healing power of her 
grave. It is important to note that the 
story of her death could have been, but 
was not, frame as a martyrdom 
narrative. She is instead depicted as a 
Muslim saint whose spiritual powers 
benefit Hindus as well as Muslims. This 
establishes the possibility of parallel 
pluralism. Framing it as a martyrdom 
story would define Hindu-Muslim 
relations in conflictual terms.57 
Some Balinese Hindus think that 
greater recognition of Siti Khotijah 
                                                     
57 Healing can provide an entry point 
for parallel pluralism even in areas with 
histories of violent conflict. In the neighboring 
Lombok, where there is a history of conflict 
between Balinese Hindus and indigenous Sasak 
Muslims Hindus regularly visit Muslim shrines 
known for healing powers. 
could promote tolerance and pluralism 
in modern Bali.  A local government 
website from Sukolilo Baru where her 
grave is located states:58 
 
The sacred grave at Pemecutan is a 
Muslim grave located in the middle 
of a Hindu cemetery in Pemecutan 
in Denpasar. This grave is that of a 
descendant of the king of 
Pemecutan. It is holy for both 
Hindus and Muslims. This grave is 
also a symbol of how communities 
with different religious beliefs can 
be united. Neither Hindus nor 
Muslims claim exclusive 
understandings. They are like two 
colours brought together in one 
pot. The situation at the grave of 
Siti Khotijah is a tool for unifying 
Muslims with Hindus, who are the 
majority religion on the island of 
Bali. 
 
This is perhaps an overly 
optimistic assessment. It is likely to be 
the case for Balinese Hindu devotees, 
but evidence suggests that a provincial 
level a form parallel civic pluralism 
located within national level Indonesian 
identity space and symbology 
supersedes locally defined additive civic 
pluralism. 
 
Indonesian Parallel Pluralism as 
State Symbology 
Indonesia was first imagined, in 
Anderson’s sense of the term, and 
subsequently constructed as a successor 
state to the Netherlands Indies.59 It’s 
territorial boundaries and identity space 
were imagined by Dutch educated 
intellectuals in the early twentieth 
                                                     
58 
https://kimbaharisukolilobaru.blogspot.com/20
18/03/makam-raden-ayu-pemecutan-atau-
raden.html  
59 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Kahin, G., 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952)  
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century. They were explicitly articulated 
at the 1928 Youth Conference at which 
delegates from Ambon, Java, Sulawesi 
and Sumatra, pledged to put aside ethic 
and religious differences and recognize 
one motherland and one nation and 
Indonesian as the language of national 
unity.60 
Questions concerning the place of 
religion, and especially Islam, in the 
emerging Indonesian symbology were 
debated throughout the remainder of 
the colonial era. Muslim nationalists, 
among whom Mohamed Natsir (1908-
1993) was the most influential were in 
favour of an explicitly Islamic state 
while secular nationalists including 
Indonesia’s first president Soekarno 
(1901-1970, president 1945-1967) 
advocated the formal separation of 
religion and the state. A debate between 
Natsir and Soekarno in the pages of 
Pandji Islam and other Islamic and 
Nationalist periodicals was emblematic 
of a larger political conflict about what 
symbology would dominate the newly 
imagined nation. 61   
                                                     
60 Foulcher, K., “Sumpah Pemuda: The 
Making and Meaning of a Symbol of Indonesian 
Nationhood”, (Asian Studies Review, 2000). 
61 Nurdin, A., “Revisiting Discourse on 
Islam and State Relations in Indonesia: The 
Views of Soekarno, Natsir and Nurcholish 
Madjid”, (Journal of Indonesian Islam, 2016) As 
Effendy notes this does not suggest that 
Soekarno and other secular nationalists were 
any less committed to Islam than Natsir and his 
compatriots, but rather that they felt that there 
is a critical distinction between religion and 
politics. Soekarno’s position was that Islam 
could only flourish as a religion if it was free 
from political interference and manipulation. 
Natsir, was among the most influential leasers of 
Islamic political party Masyumi until Soekarno 
banned it in 1960 and later founded the Islamist 
organization Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia, held that Islam is a totalistic way of 
life and that, as such, it is necessarily political. 
Effendy, B., Islam and the State in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2003); On Soekarno and his political and 
religious views see:  Legge, J. Sukarno: A Political 
These debates were resolved, 
tentatively as it turned out, only shortly 
before the proclamation of 
independence on August 17th 1945 with 
the establishment of Pancasila as the 
basic nationalist principle and strategy 
for managing diversity. Indonesia 
emerged as religious state without an 
official religion. Indonesian state 
symbology is based on Pancasila (Five 
Principles) formulated by the country’s 
first president Soekarno on the eve of 
Independence62  It was intended to 
bring a measure of unity to a vast, 
diverse ethnoreligious identity space. As 
Madjid observes, the five principles: 1.) 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Devotion to 
the all-powerful God), 2.) Kemanusiaan 
yang adil dan beradab (Just, well-
mannered humanism), 3.) Persatuan 
Indonesia (Indonesian unity), 4.) 
Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat 
kebijaksanaan dalam 
permusyawaratan/perwakilan 
(Populism/democracy with wise 
leadership assisted by consultation 
[with the people] and 5.) Keadilan sosial 
bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social 
justice for all of the Indonesian people) 
are deconfessionalized versions of 
common Islamic principles including the 
unity of God (tawhid) and justice (adl).63 
). The first principle originally included 
                                                                            
Biography (London: Allen Lane, 1972); and 
Soekarno and Soekarno., Under the Banner of 
Revolution (Jakarta: Publication Committee, 
1966); On Natsir and his political and religious 
views see: Kahin, A., Islam, Nationalism and 
Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad 
Natsir (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore Press, 2012); and Burns, P., 
Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca 
Sila (Cairns: Committee of South-East Asian 
Studies, James Cook University, 1981). 
62 Boland, B., The Struggle of Islam in 
Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1982). 
63 Madjid, N., (1996) op. cit. There have 
been many translations of the wording of the 
Pancasila principles. I have chosen to remain as 
close as possible to the Indonesian original. 
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what has come to be known as the 
Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) that 
states: “with the obligation for Muslims 
to abide by the Shari’ah.”  This would 
have established Indonesia as a quasi-
Islamic state. It was deleted to secure 
the agreement of Christian minorities. 64 
The primacy of Muslim inspired 
monotheism would require the 
reformulation of Buddhism, Hinduism, 
and most recently indigenous religions, 
in monotheistic terms to bring them 
under the Pancasila umbrella. This was 
seemingly not an important 
consideration in 1945 because the 
Japanese appointed Badan Penyelidik 
Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(Body for the Study of Activities leading 
towards Indonesian Independence) was 
composed of Christians and Muslims. 
Pancasila is often described as an 
ideology, but as Morfit notes, it lacks the 
specificity characteristic of political 
ideologies.65  Precisely because of its 
ambiguity, it can be described more 
accurately as a symbology. It has been 
the subject of diverse interpretations 
and often intense debate and has been a 
source of both unity and discord.66 The 
primacy of Pancasila is a constant in 
Indonesian political thought and 
symbology that has legitimized regimes 
with radically different agendas. It is 
also used as a symbol of real life 
pluralism. Families resulting from 
religiously mixed marriages of refer to 
themselves as Pancasila families.  
Attempts to Islamicize it by reinstating 
the Jakarta Charter have failed 
                                                     
64 Al-Hamdi, R., “The Jakarta Charter in 
Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Political Thoughts of 
the Elites in Muhammadiyah”, (Masyarakat 
Indonesia, 2015). 
65 Morfit, M., “Pancasila: The Indonesian 
State Ideology According to the New Order 
Government”, (Asian Survey, 1981). 
66 Vatikiotis, M., Indonesian Politics 
Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New 
Order (London: Routledge, 2013). 
consistently.67 In 2018 the Islamist 
group Hizbul Tahrir Indonesia was 
banned for advocating abandoning 
Pancasila and establishing a Caliphate. 
Muslim organizations including 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and 
the semi-official Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia supported this move. None 
consider HTI to be theologically deviant, 
and as such subject to Indonesia’s 
blasphemy law, but find its opposition 
to Pancasila to be unacceptable.68 
As formulated Pancasila was vague 
enough to allow for diverse 
interpretations. Soekarno stressed the 
third principle, national unity, and 
wanted it to be the first. He was vague 
about the other sila because national 
unity and identity were his priorities. 
His goal was to make unity out of 
diversity.  
Soekarno spoke of Pancasila in a 
prophetic, utopian mode characteristic 
of revitalization movements. In 
emotionally charged speeches including 
“The Birth of Pancasila” he claimed not 
to have invented Pancasila, but to have 
discovered it, looking into the collective 
soul of the Indonesian people.69 He 
                                                     
67 Elson, R., “Another Look at the Jakarta 
Charter Controversy of 1945”, (Indonesia, 
2009). 
68 NU Online, “HTI Tidak Sesat, Tapi 
Tidak Tepat di Indonesia”, 
https://www.google.co.id/search?q=hti+sesat&
oq=HTI&aqs=chrome.1.69i59l2j69i60j0l3.5653j
0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (2018); 
Tribune News Bogor (2017) “HTI Dibubarkabn, 
Ini Kata Ketua Umum Muhammadiyah”, 
http://bogor.tribunnews.com/2017/05/08/hti-
dibubarkan-ini-kata-ketua-umum-
muhammadiyah (2018); Kompas.com, “Menurut 
MUI, Ideologi dan Aktivitas HTI Bertentangan 
dengan Pancasila,” 
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/07/2
1/05100001/menurut-mui-ideologi-dan-
aktivitas-hti-bertentangan-dengan-pancasila 
(2018). 
69 Steenbrink, K., “Pancasila as an 
Ambiguous Instrument for Interreligious 
Harmony and Development in Indonesia, 1945-
2015”, (Nagoya: Bulletin of the Nazan Center for 
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claimed that Pancasila   was his gift to 
the Indonesian people.  Religion was his 
gift to the Communists who rejected it. 
Marxism was his gift to the Muslim 
community who feared it. 
He often invoked the image of the 
ratu adil (just king) who, according to 
Javanese prophecies, would establish 
justice and prosperity after a time of 
chaos and oppression.70 He was an avid 
fan of the Javanese wayang (shadow 
play) and saw himself as Gatokaca, the 
protagonist in a cosmic war pitting good 
against evil.71 Gatokaca is a popular 
warrior character known for great 
strength and magical powers. Unlike 
other wayang characters he is 
somewhat coarse (kasar) making him an 
ideal populist warrior hero which fitted 
with Soekarno’s presentation of self.  
In the Birth of Pancasila, he spoke 
of a parallel pluralism that fell short of 
Indonesia’s diversity: 
Not only should the people of 
Indonesia have belief in God, but every 
Indonesian should believe in his own 
particular God. The Christian should 
                                                                            
Asia-Pacific Studies, 2015). 
70  Friend, T., Indonesian Destinies 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); 
Dahm, B. Sukarno and the Struggle for 
Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1969); Revitalization 
movements predicting the imminent arrival of a 
ratu adil were common in the colonial era and 
have continued to emerge in post-colonial 
Indonesia. Van der Kroef, “The Messiah in 
Indonesia and Melanesia”, (Scientific Monthly, 
1952); Kartodirdjo, S., The Peasants Revolt in 
Banten in 1888: A Case of Social Movements in 
Indonesia (The Hague: KTLV, 1966); Woodward, 
M., The Javanese Dukun: Healing and Moral 
Ambiguity, in: Java, Indonesia and Islam 
(Springer: New York, 2011). 
71 Wayang plays are Islamicized 
versions of the Sanskrit Mahabharata and 
Ramayana epics. Anderson observes thwayang 
characters figure significantly in metaphoric 
forms of Javanese and Indonesian political 
discourse. They are so well known that many 
Javanese instantly recognize personality traits 
associated with them. See:  Anderson, B., 
Mythology and Tolerance of the Javanese.  
worship God according to the 
teachings of Jesus Christ; Muslims 
according to the teachings of the 
Prophet Muhammad; Buddhists 
should discharge their religious rites 
according to their own books. But let 
us all have believe in God. The 
Indonesian state shall be a state where 
every person can worship God in 
freedom ... without ‘religious egoism’. 
And the State of Indonesia should be a 
State incorporating the belief in God. 
Let us observe, let us practice religion, 
whether Islam or Christianity, in a 
civilised way ... the way of mutual 
respect.72  
 
Sperber shows that symbolism 
evokes rather than transmits meaning.73 
It also evokes emotion. An ambiguously 
structured symbology allows for a 
greater range of evocations that 
promotes social inclusivity. This was 
especially important for the first and 
fifth Pancasila principles, belief in God 
and social justice. The first principle was 
so vague that Christians and Muslims 
could identify with it. Buddhism and 
Hinduism did not fit as well and 
required creative theology to make 
them monotheistic. Social justice was so 
vaguely stated it could unite 
Communists, Liberal Democrats, 
Christian and Muslim religious groups 
monarchists. Appeals to the spirit of 
revolutionary struggle moved people of 
different religious and political 
orientations to disregard difference and 
unite in a common cause. 
This vague, evocative symbology 
was less suited to the tasks of nation 
building regulating political 
competition.74 In the post-revolutionary 
period Soekarno’s ideological and 
symbolic creativity were incapable of 
meeting Indonesia’s political and 
                                                     
72 Friend, op.cit. 
73 Sperber, D., Rethinking Symbolism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
74 Feith, H., The Decline of Constitutional 
Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1964). 
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economic challenges. Increasingly 
complex symbologies such as Nasakom 
in which he attempted to bring 
nationalism, religion and communism 
combined with the personalist rule of 
Guided Democracy were not up to the 
tasks at hand.75   
Soekarno’s symbology collapsed in 
the wake of a failed coupe on September 
30, 1965 that led to spasms of religion 
and class based violence in which 
hundreds of thousands were killed. The 
outcome was establishment of the 
authoritarian, military backed New 
Order regime of Indonesia’s second 
president Suharto which was to last 
until 1998.76 Suharto was as dedicated 
to Pancasila as his predecessor, but 
understood it very differently. His New 
Order (1966-1998) was an 
authoritarian, managerial regime that 
did not brook dissent or ideological 
debate. It was single-mindedly focused 
on economic development and “rest and 
order” policies similar to those of the 
Dutch colonial era. It relied on state 
technologies including brute force 
rather than symbology and charisma to 
buttress the third and fourth Pancasila 
principles: national unity and wise 
leadership. 77 For Suharto, consultation 
meant efforts to forge elite consensus 
rather than participatory democracy. 
Elections were celebrated as “festivals 
of democracy” and were more festive 
than democratic.  
                                                     
75 On Guided Democracy see: Feith, H. 
and Castles, L., Indonesian political thinking 
1945-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1970); and Lev, D., The Transition to Guided 
Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 
(Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
1966). 
76  Robinson, G., The Killing Season: A 
History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). 
77 Weatherbee, D., “Indonesia in 1984: 
Pancasila, Politics, and Power”, (Asian Survey, 
1985).  
Implementing Pancasila, Suharto 
operated in a priestly mode. The New 
Order developed an authorative 
interpretation of Pancasila. In 1978, it 
introduced the P-4 (Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengalaman 
Pancasila) program that required civil 
servants, religious leaders and others to 
attend courses on official 
interpretations of Pancasila.78 No matter 
how it is interpreted, Pancasila 
symbology affirms parallel civic 
pluralism linking bounded religious 
traditions. The constitution and 
subsequent legislation require that 
every citizen profession one of six 
religions: Islam, Protestant and Roman 
Catholic Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism and Confucianism.  The 
official definition of religion applies an 
Islamic understanding of monotheism to 
other religions, especially Buddhism, 
Indigenous Religions and Hinduism, to 
which it is not well suited because it 
requires that every religion be 
monotheistic and recognize a prophet 
and a holy book.79  Official recognition is 
important because without it, people 
                                                     
78 Mofit, M., “Pancasila, The Indonesian 
State Ideology According to the New Order 
Government”, (Asian Survey, 1981). 
79 Woodward, M., “Textual Exegesis as 
Social Commentary: Religious, Social and 
Political Meanings of Indonesian Translations of 
Arabic Hadith Texts”, (The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 1993); Madjid, N., The Search of the 
Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The 
Indonesian Experiences (1998) In: Woodward, 
M., Toward a New Paradigm: Recent 
Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought 
(Tempe AZ: Arizona State University Program 
for Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series, 
1996); Java, Indonesia and Islam, New York: 
Springer, 2011); Brown, I., “Contemporary 
Indonesian Buddhism and Monotheism”, 
(Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 
Abalahin, A., A Sixth Religion? Confucianism and 
the Negotiation of Indonesian-Chinese Identity 
under the Pancasila State (2005) In: Willford, A. 
and George, K., (Eds.) Spirited Politics: Religion 
and Public Life in Contemporary Southeast Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornel University Press). 
JURNAL AQLAM – Journal of Islam and Plurality –Volume 4, Nomor 2, Desember 2019 
 
310 
 
cannot obtain national identification 
cards, register marriages, obtain 
passports, bury their dead in public 
cemeteries or enrol their children in 
public schools.  
Indonesia has used increasingly 
powerful and efficient state 
technologies define Balinese religion in 
ways that would have hardly been 
recognizable in the seventeenth century. 
There has been a shift from ritual to 
textuality and a move from polytheism 
towards monotheism.80 This 
transformative effort has been so 
successful that many Balinese now 
believe that Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, 
the term used for “God” is an indigenous 
concept. In fact, it was invented by 
Christian missionaries. Balinese 
intellectuals adapted it in the 1950s to 
align their traditions with  Indonesia’s 
monotheistic state symbology.81 There 
is now also considerable tension 
between factions stressing Balinese 
Hinduism as a variant of a “universal” 
Hinduism rooted in South Asian 
traditions and others promoting a 
return to “authentic” Balinese 
tradition.82 Universalists have 
                                                     
80 McDaniel, J., “Agama Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia as a New Religious Movement: 
Hinduism Recreated in the Image of Islam”, 
(Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and 
Emergent Religions, 2005)., In 2017 the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled that the 
government must recognize indigenous 
religions. The ruling remains controversial and 
implementing regulations have not yet been 
formulated. Maarif, S., Pasang Surut Rekognisi 
Agama Leluhur dalam Politik Agama di Indonesia 
(Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2017); The Baha’i faith was 
recognized as a religion in 2014; Nurish, A., 
“Welcoming Baha'i: New official religion in 
Indonesia”, (Jakarta Post, August 8, 2014). 
81 Bakker, F., “Balinese Hinduism and 
the Indonesian State: Recent Developments”, 
(Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 
1997). 
82 Picard, M., From Agama Hindu Bali to 
Agama Hindu and Back: Towards a Relocation of 
the Balinese Religion (2011) In: Picard, M. and 
Madinie, R., (eds.) The Politics of Religion in 
incorporated South Asian Sanskrit texts 
including the Vedas into their version of 
Balinese Hinduism and reduced the 
importance of household and temple 
rituals. This shift to bounded textuality 
limits pluralism. Parallel civic pluralism 
is maintained by the deployment of 
integrative and potentially coercive 
state technologies. The hardening of 
confessional boundaries makes additive 
pluralism difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish or maintain.  
 
Post-New Order Decentralization and 
the Emergence of Provincial 
Symbologies  
Decentralization policies put in 
place following the 1998 democratic 
transition have led to the establishment 
of religiously and culturally exclusivist 
provincial and local level symbologies 
throughout Indonesia.83  In some 
Muslim majority areas including Aceh, 
South Sulawesi and West Java Perda 
Shari’ah (Regional Shari’ah Regulations) 
have been used to reinforce Muslim 
identities. These regulations, such as 
those put in force in South Sulawesi, 
requiring Muslim couples to be able to 
read the Qur’an prior to marriage,  and 
in West Java requiring civil servants to 
wear “Muslim” clothing on Fridays, have 
little to do with Shari’ah, but have 
become elements of provincial 
symbologies.84 An Acehnese Shari’ah 
                                                                            
Indonesia. Syncretism, Orthodoxy and Religious 
Contention in Java and Bali (London: Routledge). 
83 On decentralization see: Bell, G., “The 
New Indonesian Laws Relating to Regional 
Autonomy: Good Intentions, Confusing Laws”, 
(Asian Pacific Law and Policy Journal, 2001); 
and Holzappel, C. and Ramstedt, M., 
(eds) Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in 
Indonesia: Implementation and 
Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2008). 
84 On Perda Shari’ah see: Bush, R., 
Regional “Sharia” Regulations in Indonesia: 
Anomaly or Symptom? (2008) In:  Fealy, G & 
White, S., (eds.) Expressing Islam: Religious life 
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specialist trained at al-Azhar University 
in Cairo I spoke with in 2010  put it this 
way: “We had great hopes for Shari’ah, 
but in Aceh today, Shariah is about 
nothing more than women’s clothing.”   
Increasingly strict enforcement of 
Bali’s Day of Silence (Nyepi), observed 
for twenty-four hours on the eve of the 
Balinese New Year, serves similar 
purposes. Work, travel and 
entertainment are forbidden. These 
were traditionally voluntary religious 
observances but are now required and 
enforced by the provincial government. 
Muslim prayers are exempt from these 
restrictions in recognition of the need to 
maintain civic pluralism. 
The construction of provincial 
mosques also contributes to Muslim 
provincial symbolies.  Some of these, 
including the one in West Sumatra, are 
based on local architectural tradition 
and ethnic symbolism. Others are 
notable only for their size.  There have 
been similar developments in Bali and 
in Christian majority areas including 
Manado in North Sulawesi where an 
enormous statue of Jesus dominates the 
city’s skyline.85 An enormous (120 
meter) statue of the Hindu God Visnu 
seated on a Garuda (mythological bird 
and Vishnu’s mount in Balinese and 
South Asian Hinduism) located near the 
international airport was completed in 
August 2018.  It is named Garuda Wisnu 
Kencana (Golden Garuda Visnu) and 
abbreviated GWK. The Indonesian 
Ministry of Tourism describes it as “an 
icon of the paradisiacal island of Bali, 
                                                                            
and politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). 
85 Meuleman, J., “From New Order to 
National Disintegration. The Religious Factor 
between Reality, Manipulation, and 
Rationalization”, (Archipel, 2002); Swazey, K., “A 
Place for Harmonious Difference: Christianity 
and the Mediation of Minahasan Identity in the 
North Sulawesi Public”, (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Department of Anthropology, University of 
Hawai’i at Manoa, 2013). 
but its Garuda also symbolizes 
Indonesia’s national unity in its multiple 
diversity.”86  Bhinneka Tunggal Ika 
(Unity in Diversity) is the Indonesian 
national motto. A Garuda adorned with 
a shield with symbols representing the 
five principles of Pancasila is the 
national emblem. GWK is a multivocal 
symbol of local Hindu hegemony and 
national unity. 
In Bali Muslims are subordinated 
in the same ways that non-Muslims are 
in some Muslim majority areas. The 
subordination of Balinese Muslims is 
apparent in difficulties they have 
securing permission to build mosques 
and the requirement that domestic 
immigrants have special residency and 
work permits.87 Some Hindu extremists 
see Islam and Muslims as a threat to 
Balinese cultural and religious purity, 
and warn of the danger of Muslim 
violence. Memories of the 2002 and 
2005 terrorist attacks fuel these 
sentiments. There is a tendency to view 
even ethnically Balinese Muslims as 
“foreigners.”  The provincial 
government and elements of the Hindu 
elite promote an exclusivist Hindu 
identity based on religious homogeneity 
                                                     
86 Government of Indonesia Ministry of 
Tourism, “Spectacular Garuda Wisnu Kencana 
Statue on Bali in Final Stage of Completion.” 
https://www.indonesia.travel/gb/en/news/spe
ctacular-garuda-wisnu-kencana-statue-on-bali-
in-final-stage-of-completion, (2018). 
87 Religious minorities often find it 
difficult to secure permission to build “houses of 
worship” in many parts of Indonesia because of 
a 2006 decree by the Ministry of Religion 
requiring community approval for their 
construction. Because minorities are 
geographically localized this means that all 
religious groups have difficulties securing 
permission to build houses of worship in areas 
in which they are minorities. See Crouch, M., 
“Implementing the Regulation on Places of 
Worship in Indonesia: New Problems, Local 
Politics and Court Action”, (Asian Studies 
Review, 2010). This decree was intended to 
ameliorate religious tension, but has had to 
opposite effect.  
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and a return to the “true” Bali.88  
References to Kebalian (Balineseness) 
and slogans such as “Bali for the 
Balinese” are increasingly common. 
These sentiments have given rise to a 
nativist social movement known as Bali 
Ajeg that would severely limit civic 
pluralism.  Bagus observes that this 
movement shares many exclusivist 
features with Indonesian Islamism 
harassing  people who fail to comply 
with newly imagined religious norms.89 
Should it become the dominant force in 
provincial politics, this nativist 
symbology would allow only for a 
limited form of parallel civic pluralism 
in which other religions, especially 
Islam, would be subject to increased 
discrimination.   
Balinese Muslims increasingly see 
themselves as second class citizens.  
Large Muslim organizations including 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama 
circumvent regulations limiting mosque 
construction by using other terms for 
buildings that are obviously mosques. 
Many, especially Salafis, avoid social 
encounters with Balinese Hindus. Many 
feel compelled to explain that they are 
not extremists or terrorists.  These 
tensions are especially apparent in the 
Denpasar area where there are 
substantial numbers of Muslim 
immigrants from Java, Lombok and 
Sulawesi. They are less pronounced in 
the Klungkung area where there are 
centuries old Muslim communities and 
much smaller immigrant communities.  
Parallel pluralism is symbolized by 
the Puja Mandala, a religious complex in 
                                                     
88 Allen, P., and Palermo, C., “Ajeg Bali: 
Multiple Meanings, Diverse Agendas,” 
(Indonesia and the Malay World, 2005); Rhoads, 
E., “Bali Standing Strong”, (Inside Indonesia, 
2007). 
89 Bagus, M., “Getting the Monkey off 
Your Back: Women and the Intensification of 
Religious Identities in Post-bomb Bali, 
Indonesia”, (Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 2010). 
Nusa Dusa that includes Roman Catholic 
and Protestant Churches, a Buddhist 
Temple, a Mosque and a Hindu Balinese 
Temple. Construction of this inter-faith 
complex began in 1997. It was not an 
expression of “grass roots” pluralism 
but an element President Suharto’s 
strategy to control religion and impose 
Pancasila based civic pluralism.90 It was 
also intended to convince tourists that 
Bali was a peaceful, religiously tolerant 
destination.  It was financed by the 
Ministry of Religion and the government 
owned Bali Tourism Development 
Corporation. Significantly Nusa Dusa is 
an upmarket self-contained destination 
resort complex.  Puja Mandala is an 
aspect of the “touristification” or 
“Disneyfication” of Bali.  Promoting 
pluralism serves to enhance the 
politically constructed image Bali as an 
island of tranquillity removed from the 
conflicts and tensions of modernity. It 
shows tourists what the Suharto 
government wanted them to see.  
Controversies surrounding the 
complex indicate that it’s symbolism is 
more pluralistic than Balinese society. 
Muslim and Christian leaders were 
more enthusiastic about the project 
than Hindus for two reasons: First 
because it acknowledged diversity.  
Second, it enabled them to build places 
of worship without going through the 
arduous permission process. Some 
Hindus opposed the project because 
they felt that it would dilute Balinese 
Hindu identity by moving from diversity 
to pluralism.  Others added a hegemonic 
                                                     
90 Putra, N., Puja Mandala: An Invented 
Icon of Balinese Religious Tolerance (2014); in 
Hauser-Schäublin, B. and Harnish, D., Between 
Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating 
Identities within Majority-Minority Relationships 
in Bali and Lombok (Leiden: Brill, 2014); On the 
New Order’s attempts to establish a hegemonic 
Indonesian state symbology see also: Hitchcock, 
M., “Tourism, Taman Mini, and National 
Identity,” (Indonesia and the Malay World, 
1998). 
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gloss to parallel pluralism by 
mentioning Puja Mandala as a uniquely 
Balinese example of tolerance and 
pluralism.   Others state that Hinduism 
requires tolerance of other religions.  
Apologetics such as these ignore the 
inconvenient truth that parallel 
pluralism was established by an 
authoritarian Muslim regime.  They also 
include tropes of the colonial and 
contemporary touristic image of Bali as 
a tranquil spiritual haven. 
 
Conclusions 
The cases described in this paper 
are examples of two very different kinds 
of civic pluralism. The additive 
pluralism of Siti Khotijah’s tomb 
borders on theological pluralism. It 
brings elements of Islam into the state 
symbology of a Hindu polity. This 
promoted the development of a 
pilgrimage site shared by Hindus and 
Muslims. The religious convergence that 
brings Hindus and Muslims together 
does not concern abstract, text based 
theological propositions, but rather the 
more mundane, and for pilgrims, more 
immediate concern with healing. The 
parallel pluralism of modern Bali is 
quite different. It is a political necessity 
designed establish harmonious 
relationships between bounded 
religious communities all of which are 
subordinated to a nominally secular, 
religiously neutral state. This is perhaps 
the only viable form of pluralism in a 
religious environment in which religion 
is defined in reference to texts based on 
mutually exclusive metaphysical 
propositions and truth claims.  
More generally, civic pluralism is a 
strategy for managing the religious 
difference. Additive pluralism 
incorporates minorities into hegemonic 
socio-religious systems in which one 
religious tradition informs state 
symbologies and adherents of that 
tradition control state technologies. It 
establishes identity spaces for 
subordinate traditions.  It is an 
attractive option for states in two 
political contexts. The first is when the 
state lacks the capacity to establish 
religious uniformity. The second is 
when it is the state’s interest to make 
space for religious minorities. 
Premodern Buddhist states in Southeast 
Asia used captive Hindu minorities to 
perform essential rituals.  Balinese 
Hindu states incorporated Muslims and 
elements of Islam to avoid conflict with 
Muslim minorities. The hardening of 
religious boundaries under conditions 
of modernity has made additive 
pluralism increasing difficult, if not 
impossible, for contemporary states.  
Most, including Indonesia, use some 
form of parallel pluralism to manage 
religious difference.  
Two theoretical conclusions can be 
drawn from these observations. The 
first is that theological pluralism rooted 
is not a necessary condition for the 
establishment of civic pluralism and 
social harmony. The second is that when 
personal and collective identities are 
defined in terms of ethnic and/or 
religion symbologies, neutral, effective 
state technologies including security 
forces are a necessary condition for 
establishing and maintaining civic 
pluralism.91  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
91 Tambiah, S., Buddhism Betrayed? 
Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); 
Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and 
Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996). 
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